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aBoUt the aLLiance
THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE was launched in 2013 by former Federal Reserve Board Chair-
man Paul A. Volcker to address the challenge of effective execution of public policies and to 
help rebuild public trust in government. The nonpartisan Alliance works toward that broad 
objective by partnering with other organizations—academic, business, governmental, and 
public interest.
The Alliance aims to be a catalyst for change—encouraging our public and educational 
institutions to give sustained attention to excellence in the execution of public policies at the 
federal, state, and local level in the United States and abroad. Our efforts will be reflected in 
meaningful research, well-supported proposals for action, and initiatives that ultimately pro-
duce better outcomes and accountability. We will work closely with the professional schools 
preparing people for public service and other organizations, always in the interest of restoring 
trust and pride in the way our public institutions implement policy.
© 2015 VoLcker aLLiance, inc.
The Volcker Alliance Inc. hereby grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive license to download and distribute the 
Volcker Alliance report titled “Truth and Integrity in State Budgeting: Lessons from Three States” for noncommercial purposes only, provided 
that the report’s copyright notice and this legend are included on all copies.
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Preface
WHEN I STARTEd THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE in 2013, I intended that the organization be a 
catalyst for change. The palpable erosion of trust in our democratic institutions of government 
demands a response. Part of that response should be sustained attention by our educational 
institutions and by the public generally to the need for excellence in the execution of agreed 
public policies in every part of our federal system. 
A particular area in which we want to make an impact is the public understanding of 
the budgetary pressures and financial reporting in America’s states—in US Supreme Court 
Justice Brandeis’s familiar phrase, the nation’s “laboratory” of democracy.
In this report we return to some of the themes and places that my colleague and Vol-
cker Alliance board member Richard Ravitch and I have explored over the past few years in 
the State Budget Crisis Task Force. If anything, state finances and reporting practices have 
continued to deteriorate in many locations.
Many US states remain under heavy pressure, as the task force reported. Overall, their 
tax revenues, adjusted for inflation, have barely recovered from their prerecession peaks.
The continued fiscal stress is tempting states to continue, and even intensify, budgeting 
and accounting practices that obscure their true financial positon, shift current costs onto 
future generations, and push off the need to make hard choices on spending priorities and 
revenue practices. 
This report, by its nature, is exploratory. It reviews budgeting and financial reporting 
practices in only three states, chosen somewhat arbitrarily for their varied experience. On 
that basis, it sets out a preliminary set of reporting principles to better assure the clarity and 
integrity of state financial practices.
The intent is to extend the analysis to all 50 states, providing a firm basis for “grading” 
the performance of individual states with respect to the integrity and clarity of their financial 
reporting. To that end, we will invite interested officials, independent experts, and educators 
to review this preliminary report and test its approach and conclusions. 
This report and project benefited from the vision and insight of Mr. Ravitch. The work 
has been carried forward under the capable direction of William Glasgall, our state and local 
project director. 
Paul a. Volcker
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eXecUtiVe sUmmarY
EVEN AS THE REVENUE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS in the United States recovers from the 
longest economic downturn since the 1930s, many states continue to balance their budgets 
using accounting and other practices that obscure rather than clarify spending choices. 
These practices make budget trade-offs indecipherable, lead to poorly informed policy-
making, pass current government costs on to future generations, and limit future spending 
options. Further, they weaken the fiscal capacity of states to support the cities and counties 
that depend on their aid. 
In 49 states, “balanced budgets” are required by constitution or by statute; Vermont, 
the sole exception, follows the practice of its peers. In truth, however, there is no common 
definition of a balanced budget, and many states resort to short-term sleight of hand to 
make it appear that spending does not exceed revenue. The techniques include shifting the 
timing of receipts and expenditures across fiscal years; borrowing long term to fund current 
expenditures; employing nonrecurring revenue sources to cover recurring costs; and delaying 
funding of public worker pension obligations and other postemployment benefits (OPEB), 
principally retiree health care. 
While these actions temporarily solve budget-balancing challenges, they add to the bills 
someone eventually has to pay. Yet few states include information about these long-term 
spending obligations in the budgets that governors propose and state legislatures debate. 
This precludes accurate, informed consideration of policy trade-offs. 
When budgets are balanced using accounting and other short-term and obscure fixes, 
the long-term consequences require a continual search for plugs to fill gaps in future budget 
cycles. The never-ending sense of crisis leads to stop-and-go funding of vital programs and 
stifles the need for serious discussions about policy. It also leaves states vulnerable when 
economic downturns occur and allows long-term obligations to mount.
This report builds on the work of the State Budget Crisis Task Force, chaired by Volcker 
Alliance founder Paul A. Volcker and board member Richard Ravitch, from 2011 to 2014. In 
sounding the alarm, the task force warned that the cash-based budgeting practices most 
states and municipalities use facilitate “gimmicks and short-term measures that obscure 
actual financial conditions.” 
In this report, we revisited in more detail three states (California, New Jersey, and Vir-
ginia) of the six in the original study to learn if their budgetary practices were responding 
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to the revenue growth provided by a recovering economy. The good news is that California 
has adopted a number of improved budgeting practices. That has helped the state win four 
upgrades of its general obligation from Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, and 
Fitch Ratings since 2013. Virginia, which has a history of more-careful budget management 
practices, has enacted substantial pension reforms but has struggled with underperforming 
revenues. In New Jersey, large gaps remain in pension and other programs.
A primary aim of this preliminary study is to lay the groundwork for a common approach 
toward responsible budget practices in all 50 states. A continuing comparative analysis should 
provide a framework for a scorecard with respect to budgeting and financing practices. By 
shining a spotlight on opaque and confusing practices and by identifying more-appropriate 
approaches, we hope to provide incentives for officials to clarify financial issues and encour-
age debate on basic policy choices. We hope to engage academic institutions in this effort by 
tapping their scholarly expertise, encouraging research on more-effective budgeting practices, 
and preparing more students for work in government budgeting at all levels.
We invite and encourage governors, budget officers, and legislators to commit to work 
with us in developing useful approaches toward effective financial policies. Recent experience 
demonstrates the need. Mounting fiscal stress in Illinois, the bankruptcy of detroit, and the 
impending financial crisis in Puerto Rico all indicate the relevance of the initiative that the 
Alliance has undertaken. 
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i. introdUction
EVEN AS THE REVENUE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS in the United States recovers from the 
longest economic downturn since the 1930s, many states continue to balance their budgets 
using accounting and other practices that obscure rather than clarify spending choices. 
These practices make budget trade-offs indecipherable, lead to poorly informed policy-
making, pass current government costs on to future generations, and limit future spending 
options. Further, they weaken the fiscal capacity of states to support the cities and counties 
that depend on their aid. 
In 49 states, “balanced budgets” are required by constitution or by statute; Vermont, 
the sole exception, follows the practice of its peers.1 In truth, however, there is no common 
definition of a balanced budget, and many states resort to short-term budget sleight of hand 
to make it appear that spending does not exceed revenue. The techniques include shifting the 
timing of receipts and expenditures across fiscal years;2 borrowing long term to fund current 
expenditures; employing nonrecurring revenue sources to cover recurring costs; and delaying 
funding of public worker pension obligations and other postemployment benefits (OPEB), 
principally retiree health care.
While these actions temporarily solve budget-balancing challenges, they add to the bills 
someone eventually has to pay. Yet few states include information about long-term spending 
obligations in the budget documents that governors propose and state legislatures debate. 
This precludes accurate, informed consideration of policy trade-offs. 
When budgets are balanced using accounting and other short-term and obscure fixes, 
the long-term consequences require a continual search for plugs to fill gaps in future budget 
cycles. The never-ending sense of fiscal crisis leads to stop-and-go funding of vital programs 
and stifles the need for serious discussions about policy practices. It also leaves states vul-
nerable when economic downturns occur and allows long-term obligations to mount year in 
and year out. Even states with the highest credit ratings are susceptible. 
The issue is long-standing and bipartisan, with democratic and Republican governors 
and legislators sharing the blame for deferring tough fiscal decisions. In this environment, 
it is no wonder that fiscal concerns have become common for many citizens. In 2013, almost 
four years after the end of the recession, 60 percent of Americans polled by the Pew Research 
Center acknowledged that their state faced very or fairly serious budget problems. And while 
57 percent said they had a favorable opinion of state government, the total was down sharply 
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from a record high of 77 percent in 2001.3 
This report builds on the work of the State Budget Crisis Task Force, chaired by Volcker 
Alliance founder Paul A. Volcker and board member Richard Ravitch, from 2011 to 2014. In 
sounding the alarm, the task force warned that the cash-based budgeting practices most 
states and municipalities use facilitate “gimmicks and short-term measures that obscure 
actual financial conditions” that would be more accurately depicted using the modified accrual 
accounting techniques already required for the governments’ comprehensive annual financial 
report (CAFR).4 These reports contain the audited annual financial statements, which all states 
produce, based on accounting and reporting standards promulgated by the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board. The Volcker Alliance is sounding that alarm again, with an 
even more rigorous review of budgeting practices in three states to show that the danger of 
future fiscal fire has hardly subsided.
In this report, we revisited in more detail three states (California, New Jersey, and Vir-
ginia) of the six in the original study to learn if their budgetary practices were responding 
to the revenue growth provided by a recovering economy. The good news is that California 
has adopted a number of better budgeting practices. That has helped the state win four 
credit-rating upgrades for its general obligation bonds from Moody’s Investors Service, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings since 2013. Virginia, which has a history of more-
careful budget management practices, has enacted substantial pension reforms but has 
struggled with underperforming revenues. In New Jersey, large gaps remain in pension 
and other programs.
A primary aim of this preliminary study is to lay the groundwork for a common approach 
and checklist to help foster more-responsible budget practices in all 50 states. A continuing 
comparative analysis should provide a framework for a scorecard with respect to budget-
ing and financing practices. By shining a spotlight on opaque and confusing practices and 
by identifying more-appropriate approaches, we hope to provide incentives for officials to 
clarify financial issues and encourage debate on basic policy choices. We hope to engage 
academic institutions in this effort by tapping their scholarly expertise, encouraging research 
on more-effective budgeting practices, and preparing more students for work in govern-
ment budgeting at all levels.
We invite and encourage governors, budget officers, and legislators to commit to work 
with us in developing useful approaches toward effective financial policies. Recent experience 
demonstrates the need. Mounting fiscal stress in Illinois, the bankruptcy of detroit, and the 
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impending financial crisis in Puerto Rico should all indicate the relevance of the initiative 
the Alliance has undertaken. 
Although our initial focus is on improving the integrity of state budgets, similar principles 
apply to local governments. While the structure of governments varies, they all engage in an 
annual or a biennial budget exercise to match planned spending and available resources. State 
budgets built upon wishful thinking and short-term fixes serve only as poor examples for the 
many municipalities similarly struggling to balance budgets and compensate for problematic 
past practices. 
By shining a spotlight on current practices and identifying more-appropriate as well as 
problematic ones, we hope to make it more difficult for elected officials to make expedient 
moves that obfuscate in the short term and impose long-term costs that fall especially hard 
on younger citizens. Until that goal is realized, states, counties, cities, and their residents 
will continue to fall victim to fiscal processes that are unfair, costly, and misleading at best, 
and deeply corrosive at worst. 
caLifornia neW JerseY VirGinia
BUdGet Practice 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
used consensus revenue forecasts • • • • • • • • •
adequately funded annual pension contribution that 
actuaries say is required • • • • • • • • •
Provided advance funding of other postemployment 
benefits (oPeB) obligation* • • • • • • • • •
Increased rainy day fund balance as economy 
recovered** • • na • • na • • na
Provided easy online access to budget and necessary 
supplemental data • • • • • • • • •
avoided delaying payments to third parties to reduce 
general fund deficit or address liquidity issues • • • • • • • • •
avoided moving future revenue into current fiscal 
year or current expenses into next fiscal year • • • • • • • • •
avoided selling assets to raise cash for general fund 
or address liquidity issues • • • • • • • • •
a PreLiminarY BUdGet rePort card: how the states are trending
• Followed best practices • needs improvement • Followed practices to be avoided   NA Fiscal 2015 yearend data not available
* Principally retiree health care     ** California funds include Special Fund for Economic Uncertainties, Reserve for Liquidation of 
Encumbrances, and Budget Stabilization Account. New Jersey made no rainy day fund contributions in fiscal 2013-15 because state failed to 
meet revenue threshold, which excludes personal income taxes.     soUrce: Survey of material practices in state budget and financial reports.
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Report Organization and Study Approach
this rePort starts with a discussion of key budget and financial reporting concepts. It 
then details the criteria we used to assess the three states’ budgets and explains why they were 
chosen. Summaries of the budget and key budget-related financial reporting practices in the 
three states and recommendations follow. 
To prepare our report, the alliance turned to former state budget and legislative officials, 
academic institutions, and experts on municipal finance to help us develop the initial set of 
criteria for reviewing state budget practices. a small team of experts then reviewed the enacted 
budgets of the three states for fiscal 2013, 2014, and 2015, plus CaFrs. They returned to state 
financial and legislative officials for clarification, when necessary, and referred to research 
on budgeting practices by the Pew Charitable Trusts, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
nelson a. rockefeller Institute of government, national association of State Budget officers, 
and national association of State retirement administrators, among others. as the research 
proceeded and new issues came to light, the team reviewed and revised the criteria. 
we propose these criteria as a checklist of responsible practices all states should adopt 
and of irresponsible ones they should resist. The alliance welcomes comments and suggestions 
on the criteria, as well as on ways to encourage state adoption of better budgeting practices and 
to make dysfunctional maneuvers more difficult. we also welcome allies eager to press elected 
state officials and candidates to commit to improving the integrity of their state budget.
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ii. the need for trUth and inteGritY in state BUdGets
FOR ANY STATE, THE BUdGET is of critical importance. It is the core vehicle used by the 
executive and legislative branches to debate and decide how much of a state’s limited resourc-
es to spend on roads, education, economic development, social services, and other needs. 
The budget is the primary means to compel decisions about spending priorities within the 
boundaries of available revenue. It is both a planning and a control document that should 
ensure that governments don’t spend beyond their means. Budget documents that are read-
ily accessible, easily understood, and devoid of smoke-and-mirrors balancing tricks serve 
the needed control function and support the required—albeit difficult—honest, democratic 
debate about trade-offs between spending and revenue-raising.
In 30 states, the budget is a one-year document. In the remaining 20, it covers two years, 
although some provide for substantial revisions after the first year.5 
Whether the spending plans are annual or biennial, finalizing a budget involves many 
steps, some of which may occur simultaneously. The role and involvement of the legislature 
and executive differ from state to state, particularly in the smaller details. Generally, however, 
the governor’s budget office starts working with individual agencies in the fall—following 
the typical July 1 commencement of the fiscal year—refining requests and assembling the 
budget. It is presented to the legislature for consideration in the next year’s session and lays 
out proposed spending against estimated revenue. 
Legislatures review a governor’s budget and vote on appropriations bills before pas-
sage, making adjustments that vary in their depth and breadth. Finally, the budget goes back 
to the governor for signature. As with any other piece of legislation, if the chief executive 
disagrees with legislative changes, the governor can negotiate with lawmakers before sign-
ing the measure or can veto the budget. In some states, such as New Jersey, a governor can 
reject individual budget items with a so-called line-item veto. At that point, the legislature 
can alter the document or vote to override the veto, though an override usually requires a 
supermajority.6
The requirement for balanced state budgets generally refers to ensuring that the annual 
operating, or general fund, budget does not exceed estimated annual revenue. Money for 
the general fund can be supplied by personal and corporate income and sales taxes, estate 
taxes, state levies on property, legal judgments, and various fees. The general fund does 
not typically include federal grants, tuition at state colleges and universities, or special 
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purpose levies, such as motor fuel taxes earmarked for highways. The revenue and spend-
ing associated with such areas can be uncovered in a number of places, including a state’s 
annual report. For example, state lotteries are often found under the rubric of “proprietary 
funds,” which comprise areas in which the state collects dollars from sources other than 
taxes to fund specific activities. 
The general fund covers appropriations for state operating expenses. Those typical-
ly include K-12 and higher education; health and human services; prisons; public safety; 
transportation; environmental protection and services; economic development; and support 
of local government. Some of the proposed expenditures are wholly discretionary, such as 
those for salaries and expenses of the economic development and environmental protection 
departments. Other budgeted annual operating expenditures are determined by prior com-
mitment or requirement. These include commitments to repay borrowed funds and associ-
ated interest, and payments required by court settlement, citizen-mandated referendum, or 
state-adopted legislation.
As a result of the recession, between 2008 and 2010, states’ general fund revenues dropped 
by a total of $77.6 billion, or 11.6 percent.7 At the same time, demand for state-funded ser-
vices rose as people lost jobs and their incomes declined. Enrollment for families, pregnant 
women, and children in Medicaid—the jointly funded, federal-state health care program for 
lower-income residents—jumped 9.1 percent in 2009 and 8.3 percent in 2010.8 Although the 
federal government temporarily eased the pain through an $830 billion stimulus program 
begun in 2009,9 much of that money was targeted at creating jobs and promoting economic 
growth rather than at direct budget relief. States still confronted budget gaps totaling $230 
billion from fiscal 2009 to 2011.10
 It’s unlikely that states will be able to count on more generous federal funding anytime 
soon. This creates issues for a bevy of programs heavily supported by the federal government, 
including transportation and housing. If states want to continue to deliver such services 
at current levels, every dollar not provided by the federal government must be found else-
where—either by raising taxes or by cutting services, including a number of other programs 
financed by the general fund. The Mercatus Center of George Mason University estimates 
that federal spending accounted for 30 percent of total state expenditures in fiscal 2014, 
down slightly from the stimulus period and somewhat higher than in the early 2000s. But 
the expansion of Medicaid means federal spending is increasingly focused on health care.11 
With Congress set on reducing discretionary spending, federal grants to states for expen-
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ditures not related to health care actually declined 20.6 percent in real terms from 2010 to 
2015, according to Mercatus.12 
To be sure, when states face temporary and unexpected financial difficulties, some short-
term budget maneuvering may be unavoidable. But cyclical shortfalls are different than struc-
tural deficits, and states must address flawed budgeting practices that exacerbate such deficits. 
This is an enduring concern. For example, as long ago as 2002, Fitch recommended that finance 
officers of local governments adopt practices such as multiyear forecasting, debt-affordability 
policies and reviews, and policies regarding nonrecurring revenue.13
Thirty-two states have capital budgets that are separate from their general fund budgets, 
although 19 exclude proposed funding for transportation. Capital budgets are used principally 
to propose and determine spending choices for buildings, infrastructure, and other items 
whose useful life extends beyond a budget year.14
States usually sell bonds to pay for items included in the capital budget, matching debt 
maturities to the useful life of the capital asset being funded. Using debt to finance capital 
projects is reasonable: Because future citizens will use the assets, it is appropriate that they 
contribute to repaying bonds or loans. The annual debt service to pay the principal and inter-
est on those bonds is included in the operating, or general fund, budget. But because state 
budgets generally use a form of cash accounting, they may include only the current year or 
biennium’s outlay to cover long-term obligations such as pensions and retiree health care or 
to replace infrastructure such as highways, bridges, and buildings.
Budgets that don’t contain accruals for the future cost of such obligations are unable to 
support informed discussion and decision making by policymakers and other stakeholders. It 
is noteworthy that New York City has not repeated its near-bankruptcy in 1975: That year, the 
state legislature required the city to balance its budgets using accrual methods recommended 
by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, which are promulgated by the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) for state and local accounting and financial reporting.15 
The requirement was enshrined in the City Charter following a 2005 ballot proposal.16
Even for municipalities adopting modified accrual accounting for budgets, the way 
present-value costs of future obligations are calculated remains subject to debate. No single 
standard is used to evaluate the replacement cost of highways and bridges, for example. In 
the area of public worker pensions, GASB’s guidelines, used since 1996, allowed consider-
able leeway in calculating a state or locality’s liability for employer contributions, including 
how future benefit payments are discounted to their present value.17 While recommendations 
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that began taking effect in 2014 limit public pension plans’ choices of discount rates and how 
benefits can be calculated over a worker’s time on the job, states and municipalities are still 
not under a single uniform standard. Nor will the recommendations specify funding levels; 
the GASB board regards that as “a policy decision for elected officials to make as part of the 
government budget approval process.”18 
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Criteria Used to Assess State Budgets
in reVieWinG the BUdGets of the three states, we started with several basic questions: 
•  were recurring general fund expenditures matched with recurring revenue, or were 
recurring expenditures covered by one-time revenue sources, such as transfers from 
other funds, loans, or bond proceeds? 
•  what process did states use to estimate their general fund revenue; were the estimates 
reasonable when the budget was introduced and when it was passed? 
•  did the states fully fund prior long-term commitments made for public worker pensions 
and health care, as well as for education, transportation, and other areas?
we then screened enacted general fund budgets and supplementary documents for key 
elements, including:
•  optimistic financial forecasting—aggressive assumptions on revenue performance or 
expense reductions without credible rationale;
•  reliance on borrowed money or payment-deferring debt structures, including deficit 
financing, delaying payments of tax refunds or on bills owed to private sector contrac-
tors or nonprofit service providers, accelerating revenue or postponing expenditures, 
and using capital appreciation bonds or other back-loaded debt structures;
•  use of nonrecurring revenue, including asset sales, and other one-time fixes;
•  Pension funding history, including trends in the funded ratio, per capita unfunded liabili-
ties, the amount the government contributes each year and how that corresponds to 
funding recommendations provided by actuaries; 
•  Funding of public workers’ other postemployment benefits (oPeB), typically retiree 
health costs, as well as trends in per capita unfunded liabilities and liability as a percent-
age of revenue;
•  Policies and practices related to rainy day funds and year-end balances;
•  Trends in state public education funding; and
•  disinvestment in infrastructure, including where possible the states’ reported statistical 
metrics on infrastructure conditions.
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Many Pensions, Many Standards
WhiLe the GoVernmentaL accounting Standards Board (gaSB) provides recommendations 
for public employee pension funds’ reporting, comparing liabilities between states is difficult 
because they are based on actuarial assumptions and calculation methods that differ from one 
plan to another. 
To project the total amount pension systems will owe retirees over time, actuaries derive 
assumptions based on their understanding of the economy and employment trends’ and provide 
recommendations to pension boards on such factors as the lifespan of retirees, inflation rate, 
and salary increases. other items affecting the calculation of liabilities include the amortization 
period; the method used for allocating cost over time; and the so-called smoothing period, which 
has allowed major gains and losses in investment performance to be absorbed gradually.19 This 
information helps states decide what to contribute to pensions annually, keeping up with what 
retirees have earned each year and providing additional funding for a portion of any unfunded 
liability that has developed over time.
The actuarial assumption that has received the most attention over the past 15 years is the 
investment return. any change in this assumption has a substantial impact on the calculation 
of liabilities. For example, when utah shifted to a 7.75 percent from an 8 percent assumption in 
2008, its funding level dropped to 95 percent from 101 percent. If it had raised the investment 
rate assumption to 8.5 percent, the funding level would have risen to 113 percent.20 of the three 
states studied by the Volcker alliance, the Virginia retirement System assumes a 7 percent 
rate of return. new Jersey’s public employee and teachers’ systems use a 7.9 percent rate of 
return; and both the California Public employees’ retirement System (CalPerS) and the Cali-
fornia State Teachers’ retirement System (CalSTrS) use 7.5 percent. a number of independent 
experts have questioned whether the pensions’ assumptions are higher than justified by existing 
circumstances and future probabilities.21
These and other calculations need to be considered when looking at the plan’s calculations of 
its unfunded liabilities. at the end of 2013, the state portion of the new Jersey pension system was 54 
percent funded;22 the Virginia retirement System was 65 percent funded.23 In California, the public 
employee portion of CalPerS was 75 percent funded,24 while CalSTrS was 67 percent funded.25
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iii. the aGenda for BUdGet reform
THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE’S INqUIRY led us to these findings and resulting recommenda-
tions, comprising a checklist to improve the quality and transparency of state budgeting:
Complete budgetary information, including how balance was achieved and whether one-
time revenue sources were tapped, should be easier to find and interpret.
Although a great deal of fiscal and financial data are available on the Internet, much of 
it can be difficult to find and interpret. Seeking out truth in budgeting and finance requires 
tapping a number of sources, including multiple documents produced by the budget office, 
treasurer, and legislative analysts, as well as direct contacts with a variety of state-employed 
and external researchers. Even then, a state finance expert might have to interpret the uncov-
ered information. In our examination, we found that California provided the most easily 
accessible information, largely because of the nonpartisan, clear reports prepared by the 
Legislative Analyst’s Office.26 But in all three states, it was difficult to trace the number of 
transfers into the general fund from various special funds, such as those supporting trans-
portation projects or energy programs, and to follow changes that occurred after the budget 
was passed, such as deferrals of spending obligations for pension funding. For the latter, we 
needed to scrutinize separate state retirement system documents. 
Short-term revenue forecasts should be transparent and supportable by historic growth 
trends. Past projections should be assessed for accuracy to help improve forecasting methods. 
Budgets are built on a projection of revenue and expenditures. If revenue estimates 
are too optimistic, a budget that appears balanced will fall short as actual collections trail 
expectations. States should track and report the accuracy of their projections, work with 
other states to refine their forecasting methodology, and establish expert advisory teams to 
review forecasting techniques and recommend needed improvements so that governments 
can better plan several years ahead.
 While consensus revenue estimating cannot guarantee accurate forecasts, the Rock-
efeller Institute of Government and the Pew Charitable Trusts cite the advantage of the gov-
ernor, lawmakers, and other parties’ reaching agreement on a single estimate.27 Transparent 
projections using multiple inputs open to public scrutiny, such as the system Virginia uses, 
could remove revenue estimates from politics and allow leaders to focus more attention on 
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allocating available resources where they are most needed. 
In addition, fiscal notes establishing the projected cost of legislation should be reviewed 
carefully to make sure that revenue and spending are estimated accurately and that those 
estimates are incorporated into budgets. Budgets should also include revenue and spending 
estimates for at least the next three fiscal years. 
Twenty-eight states have adopted a formal consensus estimating procedure involving the 
legislative and executive branches that typically leads to agreement on a number to be used 
for projected revenue.28 Many states, Virginia among them, also include input from advisory 
groups made up of economists or business leaders to help inform forecasts. 
While states differ on whether the governor must use the agreed-on figure in form-
ing the budget or whether it becomes a binding cap on final spending, the perils of a less 
transparent revenue forecasting process are apparent. For example, New Jersey is one of only 
22 states that don’t formally rely on reaching consensus to estimate revenue. Instead, the 
executive branch has the authority to set the revenue figure, and the state’s projections in 
fiscal 2013 and 2014 tended to anticipate more revenue than proved to be the case. In fiscal 
2014, New Jersey had a revenue shortfall of $1.3 billion compared with the projection in the 
Appropriations Act,29 partly because it failed to accurately gauge the long-term impact of 
taxpayers’ taking capital gains at the end of 2012 in response to an impending increase in 
federal tax rates on January 1, 2013. While the gains led to a surge in state tax receipts in 2013, 
New Jersey was among several states erroneously assuming the revenue increase would be 
repeated in future years.30 
No revenue forecasting technique is immune to surprise. Virginia, which is bound by 
statute to use a consensus forecast, nonetheless also misjudged the impact of the same federal 
tax-rate change and came up $350 million short of expectations. 
Recurring costs should be paid with recurring revenue. 
While states may need to tap rainy day funds or seek other short-term solutions dur-
ing economic downturns, the use of nonrecurring resources to cover recurring costs should 
be avoided. States shouldn’t balance general fund budgets with proceeds from debt or asset 
sales, extraordinary legal settlements, or other one-time fixes—such as transfers or loans 
from funds dedicated to specific purposes. They should follow consistent policies for revenue 
and expense management so that future revenue cannot be shifted routinely into the current 
fiscal year (or expenses pushed out to the next one) to cover an unbalanced budget. States 
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should also avoid delaying bill payments beyond the normal schedule to make current-year 
spending appear lower.  
All three states studied by the Volcker Alliance have to varying degrees relied on one-time 
revenue to balance recurring general fund expenditures. While a strong economic recovery 
and budget reforms have helped curb California’s use of one-time solutions, in past years 
officials brought future revenue forward into the current year and pushed spending out into 
future years to help balance the budget; used nongeneral fund resources to support general 
fund spending; and changed accounting methods for Medi-Cal, the state’s version of Med-
icaid, to achieve a windfall to cover a budgetary gap. 
Meanwhile, New Jersey has relied on a variety of one-time maneuvers to balance general 
fund budgets for the three years studied, including sweeping funds out of accounts earmarked 
for specific purposes, such as the Clean Energy Program. It has accelerated revenue from future 
budget years, including front-loading payments for a 15-year contract signed with a private 
sector company to manage the state lottery. It has drained rainy day fund reserves; delayed 
property tax rebates; and, to achieve a cash infusion, restructured a bond issue backed by 
proceeds of the 1997 Master Tobacco Settlement with states. 
In Virginia, officials have accelerated sales tax collections to help balance the budget 
and to a modest extent have transferred balances from dedicated accounts to support the 
general fund.
The proceeds of borrowings should not be used to cover operating expenses. 
Operating budgets should not be funded with the sale of bonds or other forms of debt 
that provide immediate cash but move the cost of debt service to future years. Even if states 
are prohibited from using borrowing to cover operating costs, there are ways to get around 
that prohibition, including shifting money from one fund to another. Governments shouldn’t 
directly or indirectly treat the proceeds of debt sales as revenue.
Most state and local governments use forms of cash accounting that have let officials 
treat the proceeds of debt sales as revenue in determining the balance of various govern-
ment funds. While states tend to prohibit the sale of general obligation bonds to provide 
funds for operating costs, the budgets of New Jersey and California have been bolstered by 
debt in past years. Both states have borrowed substantially against money associated with 
the Master Tobacco Settlement, which was intended to pay a set sum for years. As a result, 
that money will not be available in the future to cover spending.
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Both have also refinanced debt to get cash to cover current bills. California is one of 
seven states allowed to carry over a deficit to the next year.31 during the first decade of the 
2000s, voters permitted the state to sell up to $15 billion in bonds to cover past gaps. The 
bonds—plus other borrowed money and budgetary deferrals—led California to build what 
Governor Jerry Brown named a “wall of debt,” which reached $34.7 billion in 2011 and was 
still $24.9 billion at the end of fiscal 2013.
States should move away from strictly cash budgeting and toward the type of accounting, 
used in their audited comprehensive annual financial reports, that shows the true present 
value of future spending obligations.
The use of cash-based fund accounting methods by most states and localities creates 
the temptation as well as the capacity to shift the costs of today’s services onto coming 
generations by ignoring future spending for which taxpayers are already obligated. For 
example, Virginia, California, and New Jersey have failed to make their recommended con-
tribution, as determined by actuaries, for full funding of public employee pension systems. 
Yet the states’ enacted budgets show only the amount governors and legislators chose to 
appropriate for each fiscal year or biennium studied. In addition, New Jersey and California, 
particularly, have amassed billions of dollars in obligations for public workers’ retirement 
health care benefits. Virginia has a smaller long-term obligation and has set aside more 
funding to cover future costs.
The three states have substantial deferred long-term infrastructure maintenance needs 
that are not reflected in their budgets, and California and New Jersey have failed to reflect 
the cost of future obligations for K-12 spending required under statutes or judicial orders.
States must build rainy day funds to safeguard essential services during economic down-
turns. The size of the funds should be adjusted for revenue volatility, and they should be 
replenished consistently after they are tapped. 
Revenue volatility is a growing budget problem for states. A 2014 analysis of US Census 
tax data by the Rockefeller Institute showed that volatility had increased in 42 states between 
2000 and 2013.32 This has complicated forecasting how much cash governments will take in 
during a fiscal year, and suggests a need for bolstering rainy day funds and accounting for 
revenue volatility when calculating adequate balances. Yet New Jersey has exhausted its rainy 
day fund, leaving itself vulnerable to revenue declines in any future economic downturn. 
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California’s reserve funds have been inadequate to protect the state from cuts in services 
during downturns. From fiscal 2009 through fiscal 2012, its two reserve funds were completely 
empty. Voters approved rules in November 2014 to enlarge budgetary cushions and establish 
procedures for both deposits and withdrawals. But reserves are still low. About $1.6 billion 
was shifted to the budget reserve in June—still only 1.5 percent of general fund revenue. 
Virginia has solid policies regarding reserves and the goal of building its revenue stabi-
lization fund to 15 percent of expenditures. But since the recession, the commonwealth has 
not been able to increase reserves anywhere near that goal. For the 2014–16 biennium, about 
$1.55 billion was provided as a cushion for the $36.4 billion budget, but the revenue shortfall 
was about $2.4 billion, as reported by the governor’s budget director at the end of calendar 
2014.33 Filling that gap required draining still more resources from the rainy day fund.
caLifornia neW JerseY VirGinia
Capital Sacramento Trenton richmond
governor/Party Jerry Brown/d Chris Christie/r Terry Mcauliffe/d
Population 38.3 million 8.9 million 8.9 million
unemployment rate (March 2015) 6.5% 6.5% 4.8%
real gross state product, 2013 (in 2009 dollars) $2.1 trillion $0.5 trillion $0.4 trillion
gain in Philadelphia Fed state coincident index since recession 20% 10.8% 5.5%
Percentage of roads in poor condition 34% 35% 6%
Moody's state general obligation bond rating (as of May 21, 2015) aa3 a2 aaa
average annual change in general fund revenue growth, 2011–13 5.7% 1.0% 1.0%
unfunded pension liability, 2013 $130.1 billion $37.3 billion $28.4 billion
unfunded pension liability per capita, 2013 $3,394 $4,191 $3,436
unfunded oPeB liability, 2013* $64.6 billion $53.0 billion $5.4 billion
unfunded oPeB liability per capita, 2013 $1,685 $5,955 $649
Income tax as percentage of total tax revenue, 2014 55.7% 48.3% 61.3%
Sales tax as percentage of total tax revenue, 2014 36.2% 43.0% 32.0%
three states in focUs
* OPEB = Other postemployment benefits, principally public worker retiree health care.   soUrces Municipal Market Analytics survey of state 
financial data, Bloomberg terminal, Moody's Investors Service, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Governing Magazine, US Census, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, American Society of Civil Engineers.




ONCE TIEd WITH Illinois for America’s lowest state general obligation credit rating, Cali-
fornia now stands out as a budget reformer. Since 2013, its general obligation bond debt has 
garnered multiple upgrades from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch.34 
Until recently, the state employed a wide array of moves to achieve short-term budget 
relief via a significant amount of public debt, spending deferrals, and other obligations. 
Since 2010, when democrat Jerry Brown was elected governor after winning the office 
twice in the 1970s, the budget approval process has been changed. It has changed to a leg-
islative majority vote versus two-thirds approval for passage—and taxes have been raised, 
although some of the increases are temporary. The state won voter approval for additional 
improvements, including strengthening budget reserves, pension funding, and long-term 
debt reduction, as well as requiring revenue and expenditure forecasts from the executive 
branch that extend for three years beyond the upcoming budget year.35 It has also taken 
steps to improve teachers’ pension funding, though this is being accomplished in part by 
pushing the costs from the state to local school districts. 
Risks remain for California. The state is still saddled with $94.5 billion in bond debt 
supported by tax revenue, and it has amassed another $195 billion in unfunded promises 
to pay pension and other retiree benefits. Its revenue remains highly dependent on capital 
gains taxes, which means the state is hostage to the vagaries of the stock and real estate mar-
kets. Further, California has a $64.6 billion shortfall in deferred infrastructure maintenance, 
according to the California Five-Year Infrastructure Plan of 2014.36 It remains too early to tell 
if the state’s fiscal culture has changed permanently or if California will revert to its previous 
tactics in the next economic or stock market downturn.
Budget Practices overview
California’s finances have historically been among the most volatile of any state, and its lead-
ers have often resorted to a wide assortment of budget maneuvers to maintain balance during 
economic downturns. Recognizing that such actions created enormous long-term liabilities, 
Governor Brown and legislators have made a commitment to improve budget stability and 
fiscal sustainability in a state that leads all 50 in population and ranks as the world’s eighth-
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largest economy.37 Some of the notable actions include:
•  Voter approval in 2010 of Proposition 25, which reduced the legislative vote requirement 
for approval of the budget from two-thirds to majority.38 This change has helped the 
state pass five consecutive on-time budgets, versus its previous history of chronically 
late budgets built on short-term spending solutions and inadequate spending restraint. 
•  Voter approval in 2012 of Propositions 30 and 39, which increased recurring revenue to 
fund ongoing expenditures. Proposition 30 temporarily increased the personal income 
tax for seven years and sales tax rates for four years to raise an estimated $6 billion 
annually from fiscal 2012–13 through 2016–17.39 Proposition 39 changed the method of 
calculating some corporations’ income taxes to raise an estimated $1 billion annually.40
•  Voter approval in 2014 of Proposition 2, aimed at stabilizing the state’s rainy day fund. 
Mandates include using unusually large capital gains tax revenue to build up reserves; 
diverting general fund revenue toward paying down retirement obligations and debt; 
providing multiyear budget forecasts; and establishing a special reserve for education 
funding, the Public School System Stabilization Account.41 
These reforms were enacted as California’s economy and revenue were rebounding. 
By the first quarter of 2014, revenue was up more than 5 percent from its peak in the third 
quarter of 2006. The gains continued into the year, with revenue for the first five months 
running 3.6 percent ahead of the administration’s forecast.42 The state’s actions, combined 
with economic growth, have allowed California to use fewer budget maneuvers over the past 
three years and to incorporate significant ongoing spending reductions instead of relying on 
one-time solutions. California closed fiscal 2013 with a general fund surplus of $234 mil-
lion—its first positive year-end balance since 2008.43 With a $107 billion budget approved 
for fiscal 2015, the Legislative Analyst’s Office projects the fiscal year will end with a total of 
$2.1 billion in the state’s two budget reserves: the Special Fund for Economic Uncertainties 
and its traditional rainy day fund, the Budget Stabilization Account.44 
The recovery and renewed focus on fiscal reforms have allowed California to attack its 
“wall of debt,” Governor Brown’s term for the borrowings, deferrals, and budgetary obliga-
tions accumulated over the previous decade as a result of budget solutions that pushed costs 
out to future years. Aided by an improving economy, the state has made progress in reduc-
ing these obligations from $34.7 billion at the end of fiscal 2011 to $24.9 billion at the end of 
fiscal 2014.45 California expects to slash that amount to $4.7 billion by the end of fiscal 2017, 
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an 86.4 percent reduction from 2011.46
A key benefit from this reduction is the flexibility that 
will come from California’s having debt available during 
the next budget downturn to help address future shortfalls. 
This kind of countercyclical effort can help a state stay on 
a relatively even keel.
Moody’s Investors Service has raised its general obli-
gation credit rating for California by four levels since 2009, 
to Aa3, taking it out of a tie with Illinois for the lowest-
ranked state.47 despite significant budgetary improve-
ments over the last few years, however, California still 
faces a number of challenges and risks—particularly its 
tendency to overspend during boom years. Additionally, 
the full expiration of higher taxes in 2018 under Proposition 
30 poses a budgetary hazard. A failure to control spending 
to align with recurring revenue—which will be difficult 
unless the taxes under Proposition 30 are extended—might 
undermine the fiscal improvements the state has realized 
over the past few years.
revenue forecasting 
Unlike Virginia and 27 other states, California does not 
use a revenue estimate based on a consensus of the gover-
nor’s office, legislators, and outside experts. Its forecast-
ing begins with an estimate of general fund revenue based 
on a projection of national economic activity prepared by 
an independent company. The national forecast is used 
to develop an outlook for similar indicators for Califor-
nia. After the forecasts of major national and California 
economic indicators are finalized, revenue estimates are 
generated using models created and maintained by the 
state department of Finance, which develops and periodi-












reaL groSS STaTe ProduCT, 
2013 (In 2009 doLLarS)
$2.1
trillion
gaIn In PhILadeLPhIa Fed 
STaTe CoInCIdenT IndeX 
SInCe reCeSSIon*
20%
PerCenTage oF roadS In 
Poor CondITIon
34%
Moody'S STaTe generaL 
oBLIgaTIon Bond raTIng  
(aS oF May 21, 2015)
Aa3
* Through April 30, 2015. Includes 
nonfarm payroll employment, average 
manufacturing hours worked, and real 
wage and salary disbursements.
soUrces Municipal Market Analytics 
survey of state financial data, Bloomberg 
terminal, Moody's Investors Service, US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Governing 
Magazine, US Census, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia, American Society of Civil 
Engineers.
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proposals. The California Legislature subsequently prepares revenue estimates as part of its 
Annual Budget Act. After reviewing this proposal, the governor signs or vetoes the annual 
budget. When the legislature disagrees with the governor, a closure deal—occurring at the 
end of the process—provides a compromise on the budget act revenue forecast.
Research has shown that revenue forecast errors for the state’s general fund appear to 
be largest during recessions.48 Forecasting state revenue accurately is uniquely challeng-
ing in California because of a highly progressive income tax with returns that fluctuate 
through economic cycles. With its taxes heavily influenced by the Silicon Valley technol-
ogy industry and stock market cycles, California depends greatly on the income taxes paid 
by high-net-worth residents. A reliance on capital gains and equity option-related profits 
has helped make California tax revenue the fourth-most volatile among the 50 states, at 
132 percent of the national average, according to the Pew Charitable Trusts. Pew estimates 
that the state’s revenue stream was 70 percent more volatile than the US average from fis-
cal 1995 through 2013.49 
In fiscal 2015, 67 percent of California’s estimated general fund revenue came from the 
personal income tax, of which $10.8 billion, or 9.4 percent, was connected to capital gains.50 
Recently released data from the state Franchise Tax Board show that the wealthiest 1 percent 
of Californians paid 50.6 percent of the state income tax in 2012, compared with 41.1 percent 
in 2011.51 The dependence on wealthy taxpayers became even more pronounced after the 2012 
passage of Proposition 30, which raised the state’s top marginal income tax rate from 10.3 
percent to 13.3 percent, the highest in the nation.52 
Use of Borrowed money
The California Constitution prohibits using general obligation bonds to finance state bud-
get deficits. Voters must approve general obligation bonds, while the legislature authorizes 
lease revenue bonds, which the Treasurer’s office defines as long-term borrowings for public 
improvements such as state office buildings, universities, and prisons.53 Special fund and 
self-liquidating general obligation bonds are primarily secured by specific revenue, and the 
general fund is not expected to pay the debt service. California does not employ scoop-and-
toss refinancing structures—in which issuers refund debt maturing in the immediate future 
(the scoop) with bonds that may come due many years later (the toss), thus pushing the cost of 
current obligations (and the services and benefits of those obligations) onto future taxpayers.54 
While California cannot sell bonds to cover general fund deficits, it has historically 
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borrowed and transferred money from other funds. But the state’s leadership has taken 
important steps to manage cash flow in a way that avoids short-term actions that might 
exacerbate future problems. 
reliance on other nonrecurring sources
Over a number of years, the state implemented shortsighted budgetary solutions by deferring 
certain required payments using tax payment accelerations. As part of the fiscal 2015 budget 
projection, Governor Brown estimated that the state had an accumulated $24.9 billion in 
budgetary borrowing or deferred obligations as of June 30, 2014. These include Proposition 
98 payments to schools and Medi-Cal (the state’s Medicaid program) reimbursements. The 
state has also deferred its Proposition 4 required cost reimbursement to local governments 
for new programs or services. 
The state has obscured its budget problems further by changing the accounting for vari-
ous programs from an accrual basis (in which expenses are recorded when they’re incurred) 
to a cash basis (in which they’re recorded when they are paid). Changing Medi-Cal to a cash 
basis in the early to mid-2000s allowed the state to reduce spending by delaying certain 
payments until the next year and helped achieve temporary budgetary balance. Although 
this device has not been used in a decade, the legacy remains. According to the Legisla-
tive Analyst’s Office, the cost of returning Medi-Cal to an accrual basis of accounting was 
$2 billion as of fiscal 2013.55
Additionally, in recent history—but before the period of this study—the state delayed 
payments to employees; increased amounts withheld from many public and private sector 
workers’ paychecks, primarily to accelerate $1.6 billion in additional personal income tax 
(PIT) revenue; and accelerated the estimated payment schedule for PIT and corporation tax 
revenue to the first half of the calendar year from the second, thereby artificially inflating 
general fund revenue. (See box on page 27.)
status of Pension and oPeB funding
California is carrying a total of $131.1 billion in unfunded pension liabilities and $64.6 billion 
in unfunded retiree health benefits for state workers, teachers, and local school administra-
tive personnel. The combined amounts equal more than 9 percent of the state’s $2.1 trillion 
economy, a burden of about $5,100 per resident.
The two main state pension systems are the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
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System (CalPERS) and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). The for-
mer provides retirement benefits for 1.7 million public employees, retirees, and families; the 
latter administers retirement programs for 868,000 current, former, and retired teachers 
and administrators. 
As of June 30, 2013, the public employee portion of CalPERS was about 75 percent 
funded,56 while CalSTRS had set aside only 67 percent of the assets needed to pay prom-
ised benefits.57 Wilshire Consulting estimates that the funding ratio for state pension plans 
nationwide was 75 percent in 2013, up from 72 percent in 2012.58 (In 2014, the funding ratio 
estimate rose to 80 percent.59) In general, California has contributed the annual amount that 
actuaries calculate is needed to achieve full funding over time for CalPERs. That isn’t the 
case with CalSTRS, whose contributions are set through statutes that dictate the percent-
age of payroll employers must pay each year. That these rates have lagged actuarial recom-
mendations significantly contributed to an unfunded actuarial obligation of $73.7 billion 
through June 2013. 
Paying the full annual contribution recommended by actuaries doesn’t guarantee that 
full funding will be achieved, partly because the calculations are based on projections about 
the economy or mortality rates that could prove inaccurate. Although CalPERS fully funds 
the annual contribution, it still has an unfunded liability of $64.6 billion. For example, the 
actuarial liability grew in the 2008–10 period, when CalPERS and other funds took major 
investment losses.
To deal with the CalSTRS problem, Governor Brown in 2014 signed legislation aimed at 
improving its funding. The law increased member, employer, and state contributions, which 
state actuaries project will fully fund the plan within 32 years. Contributions would increase 
annually, reaching more than $5 billion. Total contributions from the state, school districts, 
and teachers equal 19.3 percent of teacher payroll and will rise eventually to 35.7 percent,60 
paid for largely by the districts. With Proposition 13 limiting the ability to boost property 
taxes, school districts will probably need other revenue sources to meet the added cost of 
funding pensions under the new law unless investment returns grow far faster than expected. 
The state also provides other postemployment benefits (OPEB), primarily health care, to 
more than 1.3 million annuitants of its retirement systems. In accordance with the California 
Government Code, the state generally must pay 100 percent of annuitants’ health insurance 
cost, plus 90 percent of the premium for family members. Partly as a result of this generosity, 
unfunded liabilities for retiree health care benefits pose long-term financial issues. As of June 
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30, 2013, California’s unfunded OPEB liability was $64.6 
billion. That is equivalent to about $1,700 per capita, 68 
percent above the median for all 50 states.61 
rainy day fund Policy and Use
Governor Brown has made rebuilding state fiscal reserves 
drained during the recession one of his top priorities. Cali-
fornia has traditionally had two reserve funds: the Special 
Fund for Economic Uncertainties and the Budget Stabi-
lization Account. Like many other states, California has 
underfunded such reserves, and high spending require-
ments for schools have made it difficult for the state to 
build reserves at all. The result: Reserves have generally 
been insufficient to protect the state in bad times. Indeed, 
from 2008–09 through 2011–12, the state’s combined 
reserves were completely unfunded.
Reflecting California’s commitment to fiscal sus-
tainability, Proposition 2—a constitutional amendment 
passed by voters in November 2014 following legisla-
tive approval—tightens rules for making deposits to and 
withdrawals from the Budget Stabilization Account. It 
requires the state to set aside capital gains tax proceeds 
that exceed 8 percent of general fund revenue, doubles 
the current maximum size of the account to 10 percent of 
revenue from 5 percent, requires supplemental payments 
to retire debt, and limits withdrawals to ensure that the 
state does not rely unduly on the fund at the start of a 
downturn.62 The legislation mandates that once reserves 
are fully funded, the excess can be used only for retiring 
debt (such as reducing unfunded liabilities for public pen-
sions) or for emergencies. 
caLifornia’s finances
aVerage annuaL Change 
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Bank of Philadelphia, American Society of 
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educational funding trend
Following voter approval in 1979 of Proposition 13, which limited local property taxes, Cali-
fornians passed Proposition 98 in 1988. This shifted the state’s education funding to a mix of 
state aid from general fund and local property levies. Proposition 98 guarantees K-14 and K-12 
schools and community colleges a minimum annual funding amount that’s set via a complex 
formula linked to the economy and number of students.63 Yet the response of governors and 
legislators to past budget gaps resulted in California’s amassing an $11.5 billion shortfall for 
its K-12 commitments by the end of 2012–13.64 
With its school spending down 3.2 percent, California is one of 30 states providing less 
money for education now than it provided before the recession, according to the Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities.65 Proposition 98 typically consumes about 43 percent of 
general fund tax revenue and a somewhat higher percentage of new revenue.66 The Proposi-
tion 98 minimum-funding guarantee will rise to $66.5 billion for 2016–17, compared with 
$47.3 billion for 2011–12, a jump of more than $19 billion in the five-year period. Proposition 
2, passed in November 2014, was intended in part to alleviate the recurrence of accumulated 
Proposition 98 deferrals by creating a separate reserve fund, the Public School System Sta-
bilization Account, financed from tax revenue related to capital gains. 
The unique Proposition 98 formula could cause budgetary imbalances again in the future. 
By formula, California school funding rises with revenue. Current tax collections are booming 
and will likely exceed estimates by billions, which could dramatically increase Proposition 
98 spending. While the challenges are modest compared with previous budget crises, the 
governor will need to balance growing school outlays with other budgetary considerations, 
including the requirements of Proposition 2.
deferred maintenance trend
According to the 2013 report from the American Society of Civil Engineers on the state of US 
infrastructure, 11.1 percent of the bridges in California are considered structurally deficient 
and 16.8 percent are considered functionally obsolete; 34 percent of its major roads are in 
poor condition.67 
Governor Brown recently released California’s first Five-Year Infrastructure Plan since 
2008, with deferred maintenance needs totaling $64.6 billion. Transportation represents by 
far the largest share ($59 billion) of that.68 According to the infrastructure plan:
“Caltrans’ current annual budget of $412 million available for maintenance priorities—
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such as patching, thin overlays, joint and bearing repairs on bridges, and minor repairs to 
drainage systems—is well under the estimated $928 million in annual needs. The $2.3 bil-
lion in the State Highway Operation and Protection Program available annually for repair 
work—such as replacement of pavement and culverts and reinforcement of overpasses and 
bridges—is insufficient to address the estimated $8.2 billion in annual need.”69
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deficits and debt in the Golden State
desPite conserVatiVe reGULations, California has historically resorted to using debt 
and deficit borrowing to balance budget shortfalls. Though not taking place within the time 
period covered by this report, these events are worth noting:
•  In 2003, California issued two tobacco settlement bonds that produced $4.75 billion in 
proceeds that were transferred to the general fund. The bonds were refunded in 2005 
and 2007 to generate an additional $1.78 billion for the budget. The state has committed 
to investors that the governor will ask the legislature for a general fund appropriation if 
tobacco settlement revenue is insufficient to pay debt service.70 given the uncertainty 
of future tobacco industry revenue and payments to the state, the agreement—known 
as a covenant—introduces potential risks to future budgets. 
•  In 2004, Proposition 57 authorized the state to sell up to $15 billion in economic recov-
ery Bonds to finance past budget deficits.71 about three-quarters of the bonds were 
issued in 2004, and some were issued in 2008. repayment is secured by a pledge of 
revenue from a 2004 increase of one-quarter cent in the sales and use tax. In addition, 
as voter-approved general obligation bonds, the debt is secured by the state’s full faith 
and credit and payable from the general fund in the event the dedicated sales and use 
tax revenue is insufficient to repay the obligations. 
•  The state has issued Ious, called revenue anticipation warrants, payable in the next 
fiscal year. California issued the warrants to bridge emergency cash shortages in 
1992, 1993, 1994, 2002, and 2003.72 It also issued $2.6 billion of the Ious in 2009 to 
pay businesses, local governments, and tax filers due refunds after legislators failed 
to pass a budget by the beginning of the fiscal year and the general fund ran short of 
cash to pay bills.73 
•  California has used loans from special funds to help close general fund budget short-
falls, generating one-time savings that avoided spending cuts or revenue increases of 
an amount equal to the loans. 
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neW JerseY
WHILE CALIFORNIA HAS TAKEN aggressive measures to get its fiscal house in order, New 
Jersey is still seeking lasting solutions. The Garden State’s budget practices under both Repub-
lican and democratic administrations dating back at least to the 1990s have produced repeated 
structural imbalances and deterioration in fiscal flexibility and credit quality; rating agencies 
have downgraded its general obligation bonds nine times since 2010.74 The budget process is 
centralized in the governor’s office, and chief executives wield significant power through a 
constitutional requirement that gives them the job of certifying state revenue. 
To produce a balanced budget, New Jersey has counted on shifting resources intended for 
other programs to the general fund and has increased its reliance on borrowing. It does not 
issue multiyear budget forecasts, and repeated optimistic revenue estimates have resulted in 
midyear adjustments that are not subject to the usual legislative budgeting process. Against 
this backdrop, the need to catch up with the state’s $90 billion in unfunded pension and other 
retirement liabilities weighs heavily on spending decisions. Unless it is reversed by a state 
court, the 2014 decision by Republican Governor Chris Christie to block a pension-funding 
schedule agreed to with the legislature means retirement liabilities will keep rising. That will 
lead eventually to cuts in existing programs, including education and infrastructure invest-
ment, unless new revenue can be raised or pension costs reduced. 
Budget Practices overview
New Jersey’s recurring revenue has failed to keep pace with expenditures. As a result, the state 
has relied on a series of maneuvers to achieve balance in a general operating budget originally 
totaling $32.5 billion in appropriations for fiscal 2015.75 According to a Rutgers University 
forecast in May 2014, the state’s economic expansion has trailed that of neighboring states 
and the nation, limiting revenue. Rutgers attributes this to a number of factors, including 
the high cost of living and doing business in the state and slower population growth.76 New 
Jersey has the largest per capita property tax collections in the nation77 and ranks second in 
overall tax burden,78 making revenue increases politically difficult. With many New Jerseyans 
working in neighboring New York and Pennsylvania, residents also pay an average of $2,000 
per capita in taxes on income earned in other states, according to the Tax Foundation.79 
As of May 2015, concerns that New Jersey’s high tax burden and difficulties enacting 
reforms of public worker pensions and retiree health care benefits have left the state with a 
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Moody’s general obligation credit rating of A2, the second-lowest of any state, after Illinois.
revenue forecasting
Unlike 28 other states, New Jersey does not use a consensus of forecasts from the governor’s 
office, legislative leaders, and outside experts to build an estimate of revenue to include in the 
general fund budget. Instead, the governor’s proposed budget includes the chief executive’s 
estimate of resources available for the upcoming fiscal year. The Office of Legislative Services 
provides a separate revenue forecast. While both are reviewed by the legislature—which can 
adjust the projections—the governor has the final say because his or her certification of state 
revenue is required as part of the final Appropriations Act. 
While revenue for the current year was projected to be $200 million over the governor’s 
initial estimate when the fiscal 2015 budget was enacted, overly optimistic revenue assump-
tions in New Jersey were the norm in the previous two of the three fiscal years we studied. 
Growing expenditures and fewer opportunities for maneuvers may have prompted the use 
of aggressive assumptions. While the legislature can cut the revenue forecast, any reduction 
must have corresponding program cuts. 
Use of Borrowed money
New Jersey is prohibited from using bond proceeds as revenue for budgeting purposes by a 
2004 New Jersey Supreme Court ruling, Lance v. McGreevey.80 The state has relied on other 
forms of borrowing to achieve budgetary balance, however. They include using bond pre-
miums as a revenue source and relying on planned as well as unplanned refinancing activity 
to generate near-term savings.
These actions insert risk into the state’s budget and, ultimately, its ability to fund future 
needs. Though debt restructuring can sometimes generate real savings, it also can be another 
way to transfer current costs to future generations. The real value of debt restructuring depends 
on the interest rate environment and on bonds available to be refunded. Like many municipal 
issuers, New Jersey has sold securities bearing coupons that are above market levels, say 5 
percent, when similarly rated bonds of like maturities are yielding less. Investors typically 
pay more than face value for such securities, and an issuer, such as New Jersey’s Transporta-
tion Trust Fund Authority, uses the premium as revenue for the current fiscal year.81 Such use 
of bond premiums costs the state more in ongoing interest payments than would have been 
required if a bond were issued at par, or face value. 
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The state’s declining liquidity has contributed to 
accelerated issuance of tax and revenue anticipation notes. 
In fiscal year 2015, a sale took place on the first day, July 1.82 
reliance on other nonrecurring sources
Large fund transfers or diversions and asset sales have 
been used to shore up New Jersey’s general fund budget. 
The fund’s balance—basically the amount of cash the state 
has available at the end of the fiscal year for day-to-day 
operations—has been declining because it has been used 
to support the budget. The balance dropped from $804 
million83 at the beginning of fiscal 2011 to an estimated 
$300 million84 at the end of fiscal 2014, according to the 
National Association of State Budget Officers. 
The Government Finance Officers Association recom-
mends that governments of all sizes maintain balances of 
“no less than two months of regular general fund operating 
revenue or regular general fund operating expenditures,” or 
16.7 percent.85 New Jersey’s reduction of its fund balance 
to less than 1 percent of general fund revenue leaves the 
state little flexibility to address revenue underperformance 
or unanticipated expenditures. For fiscal 2015, the state 
originally budgeted a modest increase in the general fund 
balance to $388 million. 
For several years, New Jersey has relied on the trans-
fer to the general fund of a portion of the balances of the 
Clean Energy Program, a separate fund financed by utility 
ratepayers and intended to promote energy efficiency and 
the use of renewable sources. Since 2008, the transfers 
have ranged from $10 million in earlier years to highs of 
over $250 million in 2012 and 2014.86 
The state has also tapped the New Jersey Turnpike 
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amount of $295 million—representing most of the payments made by the authority to the 
state under a $1.465 billion funding agreement in 2011—is being diverted to the general fund 
and away from the Transportation Trust Fund. The cash was intended to pay debt service 
on Transportation Trust Fund bonds or to finance capital projects, but the state has used it 
to reduce general fund expenditures for New Jersey Transit, its mass transit agency. Conse-
quently, the Transportation Trust Fund has been forced to borrow rather than increase the 
pay-as-you-go portion of the capital plan. 
In addition, $1.8 billion from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, originally 
earmarked for building the Access to the Region’s Core rail tunnel project connecting the 
two states, was redeployed to support specific state transportation projects after Governor 
Christie canceled the tunnel. These funds will be exhausted in 2016. The potential need to 
replace both sources of funds exposes future budgets to uncertainty and risk. 
In fiscal 2013, the state entered into a 15-year contract with Northstar New Jersey Lottery 
Group to manage its lottery and received an “accelerated” upfront payment of $120 million 
for the general fund.87 To help close a midyear budget gap, the state in 2014 also sold revenue 
it was owed under the 1997 Master Settlement Agreement between tobacco producers and 
states. In exchange for an upfront payment from bond investors of $92 million, the state gave 
up an estimated $400 million in settlement revenue between fiscal 2017 and fiscal 2023.88 
The state needs to address the loss of that money in future budgets. 
The state has also inconsistently managed the timing of revenue collection and spend-
ing. In 2013, for example, New Jersey pushed payment of $395 million in property tax rebates 
across fiscal years, from May to August, to help close a budget gap. In addition, the state has 
generated cash infusions by making occasional offers to taxpayers to pay overdue balances 
without penalties. The latest, from September 17 through November 17, 2014, was estimated 
to bring in $75 million.89 
status of Pension and oPeB funding
For decades, governors of both parties have balanced New Jersey budgets by declining to put 
aside the amount of money actuaries say is necessary, on an annual basis, to ensure that the 
state will be capable of covering future promised benefits. Underfunding of New Jersey’s other 
postemployment benefits (OPEB), primarily retiree health care, amounts to $53 billion, or 
$5,955 per capita. The 2013 unfunded liability for the state portion of the New Jersey pension 
system was about $37 billion, giving it enough assets to cover only 54 percent of promised 
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benefits.90 That is equivalent to $4,191 per person, versus 
a national median in 2012 of $2,962.91 Wilshire Consulting 
estimates that the funding ratio for state pension plans 
nationwide was 75 percent in 2013, up from 72 percent 
in 2012.92 (By, 2014, the estimate of the funding ratio had 
risen to 80 percent.93)
New Jersey’s performance in annual pension fund-
ing is poor compared with other states. While most states 
fund more than 90 percent of their actuarially determined 
contribution, New Jersey contributed only 28 percent in 
fiscal 2013.94 In 2011, pension reforms suspended cost-of-
living adjustments, increased employee contributions, and 
extended the retirement age to 65 from 62 for individuals 
enrolled on or after June 28, 2011. In exchange, Governor 
Christie and the democratic-controlled legislature agreed 
to raise payments to the pension system to achieve full 
funding of the annual contribution by 2018, at the time 
estimated to be about $5 billion. 
despite reforms in 2011, the revenue shortfalls that 
materialized toward the end of fiscal 2014 led the state to 
cut its pension payments to the system to $696 million. 
This reduced payment covered only normal costs, which 
are pension benefits earned by employees in that year 
without regard to money owed because of accumulated 
unfunded liabilities. The governor’s decision in 2014 to 
override the deal through executive action means retire-
ment liabilities will keep rising even faster than anticipated 
in 2011. That will likely lead to major cuts in other programs 
unless significant new revenue can be raised, investment 
returns increase dramatically, or pension costs fall sharply. 
The state took the same approach in 2015 and 
reduced the budgeted payment for pensions to $681 mil-
lion from $2.25 billion, but its failure to contribute the 
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full amount for fiscal 2015 required under the pension reform legislation is the subject 
of a lawsuit before the New Jersey Supreme Court. These further deferrals will make it 
even more difficult for future budgets to accommodate needed pension payments. If the 
state had budgeted to pay its full actuarial contribution in fiscal 2015, the payment would 
consume 12 percent of general fund revenue; its original budgeted pension contribution 
amounted to only about 2.1 percent. 
OPEB liabilities, which are far greater than the pension gap, now exceed $50 billion. A 
lack of advance funding of OPEB obligations is typical in most states, but New Jersey has the 
country’s second-highest OPEB liability as a percentage of revenue, according to Moody’s.95 
This discrepancy is due in part to the state’s contributing large sums to pay for teacher retiree 
health benefits, an obligation many other states leave to local governments and school dis-
tricts. Like most states and cities, New Jersey has not set aside reserves for its long-term 
retiree health costs and funds the benefits on a pay-as-you go basis. About $1.7 billion, or 
about 5 percent of general fund revenue, was budgeted in fiscal 2015 for retiree health benefits. 
Making the roughly $5 billion96 actuarially recommended contribution in 2014 would have 
consumed about 15 percent of the general fund budget. 
rainy day fund Policy and Use
New Jersey has a rainy day fund, the Surplus Revenue Fund, and a policy to deposit into it 50 
percent of collections above whatever revenue the governor certifies for the fiscal year in the 
annual Appropriations Act, excluding personal income tax revenue. The fund is accessible to 
cover revenue shortfalls or to respond to an emergency.97 However, for the past several years, 
the fund’s balance has been $0. 
educational funding trend
State spending on K-12 education accounts for about 40 percent of the budget and has risen 
by about 4 percent to 6 percent annually over the past few years. According to US Census 
data, New Jersey is among the top five states in terms of spending per pupil. But even that 
high level falls short by about $1 billion for fiscal 2015 of the required amount under the 
State Funding Reform Act—enacted in 2008 to provide for a fair and equitable education for 
all students.98 The gap between actual expenditures on K-12 and the required funding level 
would be a danger to future budgets if the state were ordered to increase funding to come 
closer to the required amount, as has happened in the past. In 2011, a New Jersey Supreme 
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Court ruling that the state had failed to uphold its constitutional requirement to adequately 
fund certain school districts resulted in an increase in K-12 funding for that year. 
deferred maintenance trend
The 2013 report from the American Society of Civil Engineers on the state of US infrastructure 
found that 35 percent of New Jersey’s roads are in poor condition, and more than a third of 
its bridges are structurally deficient or functionally obsolete.99
 New Jersey maintains a seven-year estimate of capital spending needs and is one of 
only 18 states to include its capital budget in the operating budget, according to the National 
Association of State Budget Officers.100 According to the New Jersey Commission on Capital 
Budgeting and Planning—the central agency responsible for short- and long-range capital 
planning—in fiscal 2013–15, capital requests were received for between $2.5 billion and $3.5 
billion each year. Forty percent to 50 percent of the requests were provided for in the budget.
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VirGinia
VIRGINIA HAS A LONG-STANdING and well-deserved reputation for strong budget prac-
tices that in large part reflects a budgetary process that is more administrative than political.
While the Virginia Constitution makes the governor the only state chief executive limited 
to a single term of four years, the state looks beyond the period when estimating the fiscal 
outlook. The commonwealth has a robust process for consensus revenue estimating that by 
law provides forecasts for six-year periods. The forecasts are based on input from the Joint 
Advisory Board of Economists, a statutorily established panel that includes the state finance 
secretary, representatives of both houses of the legislature, and outside economists; and from 
the Governor’s Advisory Council on Revenue Estimates, another statutory group composed 
of the governor, and legislative and business leaders.101 
despite the state’s strong revenue-forecasting requirement, both democratic Governor 
Terry McAuliffe’s administration, which took office in January 2014, as well as that of his 
Republican predecessor, Governor Bob Mcdonnell, were slow to react to warnings that Virginia 
would face severe pressure from federal spending cuts stemming from budget sequestration. 
Since the state’s economy is heavily dependent on US government spending, revenue declines 
resulting from federal reductions threaten to drain much of Virginia’s rainy day fund as it 
grapples with the challenge of an underfunded pension system.
Budget Practices overview
Virginia’s conservative fiscal management has made it one of only eight states to receive 
top, AAA credit grades from Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch.102 Professional budget 
and finance officials in Virginia tend to last through multiple administrations, while gover-
nors are barred by the state constitution from serving a second consecutive four-year term 
and thus have relatively limited influence over the biennial budget cycle. Highlights of the 
cycle include six-year strategic planning for revenue and capital spending, repeated revenue 
reestimation, statutory constraints on borrowing, and an actively employed rainy day fund. 
Although the revenue picture has recently improved, a surprise late-year shortfall in fiscal 
2014 tax receipts and a projected gap in the fiscal 2015–16 budget engendered the use of some 
one-time solutions.
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revenue forecasting
Virginia’s revenue assumptions and methodologies are subject to periodic review by a vol-
unteer state board of professional economists, and actual revenue estimates are reviewed by 
a consensus group of executive and legislative political leadership. While the practice does 
not guarantee more-accurate forecasts, its wide range of inputs allows political leaders to 
focus more on the debate about expenditures than on a debate about the level of revenue. 
Virginia law requires that governors present a forecast of economic activity each fall, 
with additional reviews of revenue midway through the fiscal biennium.103 In fiscal 2013 
and 2014, initial revenue setting appeared reasonable, despite an unexpected $350 mil-
lion shortfall in nonwithholding income taxes beginning in May 2014. As was the case in 
New Jersey, this stemmed from the state’s misinterpreting the permanence of increases 
in capital gains tax revenue realized when President George W. Bush’s tax cuts expired in 
december 2012.104 
The gap was easily managed within the year by carrying forward a budget cushion of 
$500 million in unspent revenue. However, either because it was late in the budget process 
or because the governor was unwilling to reestimate revenue by year-end, the fiscal 2015–16 
biennial budget was not adjusted downward for $1.55 billion in diminished revenue expectations 
($950 million in 2015 and $600 million in 2016). Still, the so-called money committees—House 
Appropriations and Senate Finance—subsequently adjusted appropriations to address the 
expected shortfall. Their actions included zeroing out most discretionary spending increases 
and preparing to tap the Revenue Stabilization Fund, the state’s rainy day fund, if needed. 
More recently, revenue increases have alleviated some of the pressure on Virginia’s bud-
get. For the first eight months of fiscal 2015, tax collections rose 6.6 percent, well ahead of 
the General Assembly’s revised estimate of 4.7 percent.105 Earlier estimates had projected 
revenue growth of 3.1 percent for both fiscal 2015 and 2016.106
Use of Borrowed money
Virginia’s top credit rating imposes a powerful discipline on policymakers. Although the 
state is allowed to borrow to smooth out peaks and valleys in cash flow, it has not done so in 
the last three budget years. In any event, total borrowing is limited by how much the state 
has received in the last three years from income and sales taxes. Virginia avoids using bond 
premiums for its general fund; leaders instead use the proceeds to reduce borrowing. 
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reliance on other nonrecurring sources
Virginia implemented an accelerated sales tax program in 
2009 that obligates many businesses to prepay a year of 
expected levies. While the commonwealth narrowed the 
universe of businesses required to prepay through fis-
cal 2013 and 2014, it temporarily reversed the scheduled 
reduction to help patch the fiscal 2015–16 budget.
The state also allows for transferring costs from one 
fiscal year to the next within the biennium. For example, 
the fiscal 2015–16 budget paid $12 million toward an 
$80 million transportation project in fiscal 2015 and the 
remaining $68 million in fiscal 2016, rather than spread the 
cost evenly over two years. Among other minor one-time 
solutions, Virginia transferred $30 million from the high-
way maintenance fund to the general fund—the reverse of 
how money typically has flowed.
status of Pension and oPeB funding
The state has been aggressive in reforming its public pen-
sion liabilities, which are administered by the Virginia 
Retirement System. The pension is underfunded compared 
with other states, with actuarial assets only 65 percent of 
liabilities in fiscal 2013—the legacy of years of underfund-
ing. Wilshire Consulting estimates that the funding ratio 
for state pension plans nationwide was 75 percent in 2013, 
up from 72 percent in 2012.107 (By, 2014, the estimate of 
the funding ratio had risen to 80 percent.108)
Virginia has launched three major pension reform pro-
grams in the past five years. The first reform, in 2010, created 
Plan 1 and Plan 2. The latter was for new employees, who for 
the first time were required to pay a portion (5 percent) of 
their salary toward the pension and who receive less generous 
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The second, in 2012, further cut COLAs for Plan 2 employees. In 2013, the third reform created 
Plan 3. Aimed at new employees or those opting in, it has a hybrid structure that combines a 
smaller defined-benefit approach with a defined-contribution plan, similar to a 401(k), that 
does not guarantee a specific return.109 While Virginia has historically not paid the full amount 
that actuaries recommend for the annual contribution, it is moving toward full annual funding. 
The General Assembly has put itself on a schedule to increase funding each year until it hits 100 
percent of the recommended contribution in fiscal 2019.110 The commonwealth’s budget acceler-
ated the schedule in fiscal 2014 and held to its advanced funding level in the 2015 budget, even 
though that added $150 million to the projected budget gap. With the revenue picture improving 
this year, additional pension funding was also added to the upcoming biennial budget.111
Unlike most states and municipalities, Virginia has statutory language that requires the 
funding of 90 percent of the annual recommended contribution for other postemployment 
benefits (OPEB). Its OPEB unfunded liability is modest—particularly when measured against 
California or New Jersey’s. Virginia’s unfunded OPEB liability is $649 per capita, versus a 
50-state median of $1,023.112
rainy day fund Policy and Use
Virginia’s rainy day fund, the Revenue Stabilization Fund (RSF), can be readily drawn down if 
there is enough of a shortfall in revenue. The unexpected emergence of a budget gap for fiscal 
2015–16 forced the money committees to assume that 75 percent of the fund would be drained 
over the next two years—a plan that accords with the fund’s purpose as well as with the Virginia 
Code and Constitution, and the Appropriations Act. 
The commonwealth has a well-defined policy for deposits into and withdrawals from the 
RSF. The fund balance cannot exceed 15 percent of sales and income taxes; a constitutional 
amendment in 2011 revised that from 10 percent in acknowledgement of revenue volatility 
during the financial crisis. The constitution requires that the RSF receive half of any revenue 
growth over expectations (assuming that revenue is growing faster than recent averages), 
with a statutory mandate on top of that when growth is particularly rapid. (This secondary 
mandate can and has been waived as situations demand, as in fiscal 2014.) If spending exceeds 
revenue by 2 percent, draws are permitted but for only half of the gap, and the corpus of the 
fund cannot be drawn down by more than 50 percent.
The RSF peaked at $1.2 billion in fiscal 2007, on the eve of the US recession; funding 
fell to $679 million in fiscal 2014.
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educational funding trend
Virginia provides generally lower educational resources 
than other states.113 K-12 expenditures represent about 30 
percent of general fund outlays each year, for a per pupil 
rate of $5,030 in fiscal 2015, up from $4,546 in 2012. Edu-
cation spending has been rising faster than inflation, with 
a 5.7 percent hike in fiscal 2013, 2.5 percent in 2014, and 
4 percent in 2015. 
deferred maintenance trend
Virginia divides infrastructure spending into capital assets 
(principally buildings), transportation, and water. Since 
fiscal 2009, most deferred maintenance funding for struc-
tures has come from proceeds of bonds sold by the Virginia 
Public Building Authority and Virginia College Building 
Authority, a change from the practice of cash funding 
from the general fund. In 2009, the Auditor of Public 
Accounts identified $3.3 billion in deferred maintenance 
of state buildings, more than twice the amount recorded 
four years earlier.114 Plans to regularly update that number 
were shelved in the aftermath of the recession. 
According to the 2013 American Society of Civil Engi-
neers report on the state of US infrastructure, 6 percent of 
Virginia’s roads are in poor condition, and 26 percent of 
its bridges are either structurally deficient or functionally 
obsolete.115 Virginia broke with low-tax, project-under-
funding practices for transportation in fiscal 2013 with the 
passage of HB 2313. The law is projected to raise $6 billion 
over five years through increases in state and regional sales 
taxes (in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads), and a 
restructuring of the state motor fuel tax from per gallon 
to a percentage of each sale.116
VirGinia’s finances
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Investigating State Budgets: A Complex Task
to inVestiGate the detaiLs of a state’s budget, researchers must go to more than the primary 
document passed by the legislature and signed by the governor. In the three states we studied, 
our path took us to various departments and agencies, as well as to the municipal bond market’s 
regulator, to find the necessary legislative analyses, cash flow figures, historical documents, and 
financial disclosures. In no state could we find a digital hub that would take us to all the data need-
ed to fully investigate the numbers. here are some of the sources we tapped in the three states:
california 
The California Budget website (http://www.ebudget.ca.gov) is useful for the budget itself; 
archives of budget-related documents are available in the historical documents section.
The state department of Finance (http://www.dof.ca.gov) provides information on the 
state budget process and history. It’s also the home of the state’s 2015 Five-year Infrastructure 
Plan. That is critical in assessing the percentage of capital spending requests that were funded 
and other needs that were deferred. The department also publishes the Monthly Finance Bul-
letin, an economic update and cash report useful for determining whether the state’s revenues 
are on track with forecasts.
The California State Treasurer’s website (http://www.treasurer.ca.gov) provides significant 
information. But the state’s monthly debt report and details on borrowings that may affect budgets 
reside on the Treasury Public Finance division’s website (http://www.buycaliforniabonds.com).
The Legislative analyst’s office (http://www.lao.ca.gov), a nonpartisan agency with a staff 
of 43 analysts, provides analyses of the state budget, as well as fiscal and policy advice to the 
legislature. The information is vital to putting budgets into context.
The Municipal Security rulemaking Board’s eMMa (electronic Municipal Market access) 
disclosure website (http://www.emma.msrb.org) offers state municipal bond offering state-
ments, comprehensive annual financial reports, updates to the state’s financial and demo-
graphic information, and disclosures of events affecting investors.
we needed to consult state and retirement system CaFrs to assess the funding ratios, 
annual required contributions, and actual state contributions for public employee pension and 
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retiree health care benefits (known as other postemployment benefits).
new Jersey
The new Jersey department of the Treasury website (http://www.state.nj.us/treasury) provides 
information on the budget, but we also needed to consult the state constitution and statutes 
related to the budgeting process and rainy day fund policies.
documents presented to the legislature’s annual budget hearings supplied vital insights 
about the implications of the numbers on various state departments. These include testimony 
by state officials and independent analyses of departmental budgets by the legislature’s office 
of Legislative Services (http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/ols.asp). 
The new Jersey Transportation Trust Fund authority’s financial documents, including 
yearly financial plans and financial statements posted to its website (http://www.state.nj.us/
ttfa), are important to understanding the relationship of the general fund budget to the flow of 
money among state transportation agencies. 
State retirement system actuarial reports and information included in comprehensive 
annual financial reports and official statements are needed to assess public worker pension and 
other retiree benefit funding ratios and state contributions. 
The new Jersey department of education’s website (http://www.state.nj.us/education) 
provided state education formula funding requirements so we could better understand shortfalls. 
The state’s capital improvement plan (http://www.state.nj.us/transportation/capital/cpd) 
is necessary to assess the percentage of capital spending requests actually funded in the gen-
eral fund budget and what decisions may have been deferred. 
The Bloomberg terminal is helpful for tracking data on the state’s use of short-term notes.
Virginia
The governor’s initial budget proposal is at the Virginia department of Planning and Budget web-
site (https://www.dpb.virginia.gov). an enacted version of the budget with comparisons to the 
governor’s proposal is available at http://leg2.state.va.us/Moneyweb.nSF/sb2015, the website 
of Virginia’s Legislative Information System. Subsequent budget adjustments can be found in 
presentations on the websites of the so-called money committees: the house appropriations 
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Committee (http://hac.state.va.us) and Senate Finance Committee (http://sfc.virginia.gov). 
Virginia’s Joint Legislative audit and review Commission (http://jlarc.virginia.gov) pro-
vides current budget review material and data on trends in state spending over time. 
The website of the state Secretary of Finance (https://finance.virginia.gov) offers monthly 
reviews of revenue collections as well as its presentations to the money committees, including 
revenue forecasts that come from the combined efforts of the Joint advisory Board of econo-
mists and the governor’s advisory Council on revenue estimates.
The Virginia auditor of Public accounts (http://www.apa.virginia.gov) provides regular 
updates on the size of the state’s revenue Stabilization Fund and related calculations. 
The Municipal Securities rulemaking Board’s eMMa website contains state bond offering 
documents, comprehensive annual financial reports, regular updates to the state’s financial and 
demographic information, and event disclosures.
Financial and actuarial reports posted on the Virginia retirement System website 
(http://www.varetire.org), plus regular reports by the Joint Legislative audit and review 
Commission, are necessary to obtain information on funding of public worker pensions and 
other retirement benefits.
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GLossarY 
Following are definitions of some of the terms used in this report, compiled from online glossaries 
published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (LILP), Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
(MSRB), National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), and National Association of 
State Retirement Administrators (NASRA).
comprehensive annual financial report (cafr)—MSRB defines this as a report meeting recom-
mendations of standards set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board that includes 
a state or municipality’s audited financial statements for the fiscal year as well as other infor-
mation.
General fund—NASBO defines this as the main fund for financing a state or locality’s operations. 
Governmental accounting standards Board (GasB)—The MSRB defines this as the body that 
sets standards for financial accounting and reporting practices by states and municipalities.
modified accrual basis of accounting—According to LILP, this is a method of accounting that 
recognizes revenues in the accounting period in which they become available and measurable.
other postemployment benefits (oPeB)—The MSRB defines this as future liabilities incurred by 
certain governmental entities for benefits other than pensions, such as medical care, owed 
to retired public employees.
rainy day fund—NASBO defines this as reserves that governments can tap to balance the 
budget or respond to unforeseen circumstances.
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